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It's almost sensible if you only think of one side. It's like if /etc/passwd put "NO_PASSWORD" in the field for disabled logins and someone was like, oh, I'll be clever and say crypt() returns "NO_PASSWORD" on error because that's obviously invalid and won't match. But that's exactly what *does* make it match.

But this also needs the "ddos" patch that was submitted later as well.

That seems orchestrated.



If I understand what you're suggesting, wouldn't this result in a lot more swinging since the gripper would be suspended from a single point directly above it?

You seem to. That is a good point I hadn't considered - the tension from the sides holds it in place. Maybe we need to use a telescoping arm (which doesn't seem practical, I'm mostly joking). It might still work, but I imagine if you don't grab it on the first try, you may have to go back to the ceiling. And hope there are no strong drafts in the room.

EDIT: maybe lower it on three lines instead of one?


That too is a solvable problem if you have the sensors for it. You can critically damp or choose a motion profile to have essentially no swing.

If you're editing /etc/ssl/cert.pem yourself, you're setting yourself up for failure. Use the proper mechanism to add your own trust roots (on macos it's "security add-trusted-cert").

Whatever reason Apple had for not updating /etc/ssl/cert.pem yet, I am certain it's not out of consideration for users that might have put custom certs in there.


I used to manage OS level trust root management for all internal machines at a hyperscaler. Hundreds of thousands of machines. Even when you have an edict from a common VP or CEO, and most people are even using the same linux distributions, it's hard to get people to adhere to or even understand that there is a standard. Throw containers, embedded devices, windows and mac in and it's just a total nightmare unless you exert strict control on how every single machine is set up. Which, of course, is impossible because cowboys gonna cowboy.

Fundamentally, people don't want to think about the intricacies of how we decide whether or not to trust a particular cert. They want it to just work without thinking about it. This includes that if they have a custom private root they need to trust, they just drop it various places until it starts working and call it done. And sometimes they do weird things like adding intermediates to their trust store because they were trying to call a service that has their cert chain configured incorrectly, and that "fixes it". Again, it's a nightmare.

The fact that linux, a system notoriously cobbled together by 873 different factions on the internet, is even more of a mess is not surprising in the least.


One of my last productive acts when I was at microsoft was to get a two-line change committed in windows to a tree outside my org. It took two full months just to propagate the change up the very fragile and fractured tree of repos from my team's to WINMAIN and from WINMAIN back down to the owning team's org, and my efforts were required every step of the way. It was truly soul-crushing.

Edit: this was in the windows vista days and I hope/expect they have overhauled that entire process in a major way, because things were at a near standstill.


Makes me wonder if any implementations will do the cute trick of dispensing with the seed constants and deriving them at startup from the unix timestamps. :)


That's one of those things I would consider "cute, but wrong". I'd rather hardcode for efficiency and add a unit test that rederives.


I mean, if it provably produces the same result, calling it "wrong" is a little much.


They'd be trading the seed constants for the timestamp constants, more annoying than cute honestly.


The real question is why you'd give an app full disk access if you didn't want it reading your files.


If what the writer said was strictly true, Apple would be having a little security freakout about how Muse managed to bypass this OS control. My assumption is that the writer did not understand everything he was granting it permission to do, so he legitimately believes that he didn't grant it those permissions. But he did.


Apple's statement is that the permission is being abused to do things that users do not think are possible.

In this case, Meta explicitly promises that Muse will not read your messages even after you grant it disk permissions.


> In this case, Meta explicitly promises that Muse will not read your messages even after you grant it disk permissions.

There's no reason to doubt this claim. The only person in the world who has claimed that Muse disrespects its own internal setting is the same person who claimed that he didn't grant Full Disk Access to Muse.

Ironically, Aten's own screenshot appears to show that he toggled the internal setting from "Off" to "Read only". In my own testing, it's "Off" by default, and the only way to change the internal setting is to enable Full Disk Access first.

Thus, the likeliest scenario is that Aten unthinkingly granted Full Disk Access to Muse, granted the Messages app permission, then had a change of heart, disabled Full Disk Access, and then forgot what he had done. Later, when he noticed that Muse had some of his messages, he went back and checked, and saw the FDA was disabled, forgetting that he had toggled it on and off.


In all honesty, I read your whole page and didn't find it one bit distracting or noticeable. I got to the end and saw the disclaimer about the AI writing and thought, "well, at least that'll head off the inevitable bitching about it being AI writing." Then I came to HN and saw people acting like you were committing atrocities. Sigh.


One wonders what overly-narrow definition of API you're stuck on.


One wonders why you wonder.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API


Well, given this quote from your reference:

> The interface to a software library is one type of API. The API describes and prescribes the "expected behavior" (a specification) while the library is an "actual implementation" of this set of rules.

Yes, I still wonder why you'd be picking this particular silly semantic battle.


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