One workload with observed radio discipline handling secrets, the other workload with a haystack of chatter that's not supposed to know about any of the secrets. When supply chain attack is in scope, trust only ever goes as far as misbehavior is observable. Cooperating workloads could be quite a powerful tool to make misbehavior less observable.
So many good answers here, all converging on moderation overreach stifling the page before LLM came in.
I'm not disagreeing at all, but I'd like to add that the moderation issues did not come from a vacuum: they were a reaction to SO reputation becoming so much of a CV optimisation metric that SO must have felt a lot of pressure to do something. Turns out that something wasn't good, but I'm not sure that other paths taken would have been much less bad. Some success just aren't set up to last.
> On top of that all AI companies seem to be run by megalomaniacs.
Not all of them. Only those who outspend all the others and then you never really hear of any others. It's like the most basic requirement for the job.
In the context of the current discussion (minus the part that's accidentally derailing it by focusing too much on other meanings of the term credit), credit card vs debit card is not relevant at all: they are both denominated in currency, so they are currency. This is not a discussion about cash vs electronic.
Currency vs credit, as it was used some posts up is more like quantifiable vs not quantifiable. It's not about the exact catering expenses of parties thrown ("they had champagne, we have to invite them twice!") it's about inviting or not inviting. Not about the number of hours taking over the children, it's about being there when needed.
Technically, this wording also implies that they ensure that there's always ample supply of imperfections so that they can never run out of improvements to be made ;)
NEVER run out of improvements to be made. Rule number one of getting audited.
Always leave an obvious-once-you-see-it, but minor, defect somewhere for the auditor to latch on to. One they can earmark for you to come up with a plan to address the issue before they grant you the certificate (and which you'll be able to write up in no time because you planned for it).
A good auditor and a company actually taking this stuff seriously can benefit from 27001. That probably accounts for 5% of all 27001 certifications out there.
If you're lucky you get an auditor who's just there along for the ride towards early retirement in a few years, and who'll joke with you and eat your lunch. Had one of those once. Doesn't help your security one bit of course, but it makes audit time more relaxed.
And yet I had results perfectly within the range of "good enough" having an ai harness muck about in a work folder in a docker mount on a 9P mapped drive under permanent observation by an intelliJ instance on the Windows side before some buggy Windows update made it occasionally lock up under `npm i` sized filesystem loads. Crazy how far we've come.
Have another bomb in the vicinity that did not fail and there will be absolutely no visible indication at all that something penetrated the ground.
I might be imagining this but I think that I have seen a report about some systematic effort to trace bomb dropping patterns in aerial images of the aftermath to find gaps in the pattern where something did not go off. But no idea how early or late after the war that happened (if it did happen). And those patterns will only show up for smaller bombs dropped in quantity, not for the big ones.
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