And What is "anti-globalist"? Paul Samuelson's paper shows that the simple models free trade and globalism are based on are both incorrect and especially not all sunshine and flowers for the USA:
"Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization"
by Paul A. Samuelson
"Act II, however, deals some weighty blows against economists’ oversimple complacencies about globalization. It shifts focus to a new and different kind of Chinese technical innovation. In Act II, China’s progress takes place (by imitation or home ingenuity or . . . ) in good 1, in which the United States has previously had a comparative advantage. (High I.Q. secondary school graduates in South Dakota, who had been receiving from my New York Bank wages one-and-a-half times the U.S. minimum wage for handling phone calls about my credit card, have been laid off since 1990; a Bombay outsourcing unit has come to handle my inquiries. Their Bombay wage rate falls far short of South Dakota’s, but in India their wage far exceeds what their uncles and aunts used to earn.) What does Ricardo-Mill arithmetic tell us about realistic U.S. long-run effects from such outsourcings? In Act II, the new Ricardian productivities imply that, this invention abroad that gives to China some of the comparative advantage that had belonged to the United States can induce for the United States permanent lost per capita real income—an Act II
loss even equal to all of Act I(a)’s 100 percent gain over autarky. And, mind well, this would not be a short run impact effect. Ceteris paribus it can be a permanent hurt."
That phrase, "...an Act II loss even equal to all of Act I(a)’s 100 percent gain... " is haunting.
"Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization" by Paul A. Samuelson
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~noy/362texts/samuelson.pdf
from the paper:
"Act II, however, deals some weighty blows against economists’ oversimple complacencies about globalization. It shifts focus to a new and different kind of Chinese technical innovation. In Act II, China’s progress takes place (by imitation or home ingenuity or . . . ) in good 1, in which the United States has previously had a comparative advantage. (High I.Q. secondary school graduates in South Dakota, who had been receiving from my New York Bank wages one-and-a-half times the U.S. minimum wage for handling phone calls about my credit card, have been laid off since 1990; a Bombay outsourcing unit has come to handle my inquiries. Their Bombay wage rate falls far short of South Dakota’s, but in India their wage far exceeds what their uncles and aunts used to earn.) What does Ricardo-Mill arithmetic tell us about realistic U.S. long-run effects from such outsourcings? In Act II, the new Ricardian productivities imply that, this invention abroad that gives to China some of the comparative advantage that had belonged to the United States can induce for the United States permanent lost per capita real income—an Act II loss even equal to all of Act I(a)’s 100 percent gain over autarky. And, mind well, this would not be a short run impact effect. Ceteris paribus it can be a permanent hurt."
That phrase, "...an Act II loss even equal to all of Act I(a)’s 100 percent gain... " is haunting.