For example: corporations have a lot of secondary objectives beyond profit such as limited volatility of profits that can suppress beneficial activities. State actors can take different risks and absorb such volatility by funding activities and then recovering via taxes (simplistically). In the financial markets this gets often arbitraged away, but in slow and high cost markets, those arbitrageurs aren't necessarily forming.
Similarly, time preferences can stop long-term beneficial activities by corporate actors.
In the end, it is about bridging different preferences. There are also issues of resource pooling and coordination, but those are easier to overcome.
Yes, market friction like what you note is possible. But in theory, those points of friction and inefficiency can be overcome by the market with innovations in financial instruments.
Similarly, time preferences can stop long-term beneficial activities by corporate actors.
In the end, it is about bridging different preferences. There are also issues of resource pooling and coordination, but those are easier to overcome.