An important thing in what I wrote is that it only applies to certain sorts of free will. The sorts of free will it applies to include the idea of 'free will' that many scientifically educated (and usually philosophically untrained) people have. Let's call it the 'natural' or 'naive' idea of free will. In that view, free will and determinism are incompatible.
However, as others have pointed out in parallel answers, there are 'compatibilist' views in which free will and determinism are compatible. The sorts of 'free will' that those views apply are different from the naive idea of free will and the important point to take away from that is: it may not be clear to you or me what the phrase 'free will' actually means.
I do not subscribe to compatibilist views, because they define 'free will' as something that I do not believe is worth wanting. However, that begs the question: what is a definition of 'free will' that I do believe is worth wanting? And I have found that I cannot answer that question: I cannot define it satisfactorily in a way that is amenable to philosophical analysis, while all definitions that can be analyzed are unsatisfactory.
So it boils down to this: I believe it is important to have 'free will', but I cannot define what it means to have free will. As I cannot become unhappy about not having something that I do not understand clearly enough to reason further about, my life is effectively no different from never having thought about 'free will' at all.
So that's how I deal with it. In a way that is unsatisfactory to many people, because it seems to allow for a bit of 'insert magic here' just to satisfy my emotional need for the existence of some intuitive notion of free will. To which all I can say is: yes, I believe that believing "I don't understand" and being happy is better than believing "the best answer we can come up with is depressing" and not being happy.
However, as others have pointed out in parallel answers, there are 'compatibilist' views in which free will and determinism are compatible. The sorts of 'free will' that those views apply are different from the naive idea of free will and the important point to take away from that is: it may not be clear to you or me what the phrase 'free will' actually means.
I do not subscribe to compatibilist views, because they define 'free will' as something that I do not believe is worth wanting. However, that begs the question: what is a definition of 'free will' that I do believe is worth wanting? And I have found that I cannot answer that question: I cannot define it satisfactorily in a way that is amenable to philosophical analysis, while all definitions that can be analyzed are unsatisfactory.
So it boils down to this: I believe it is important to have 'free will', but I cannot define what it means to have free will. As I cannot become unhappy about not having something that I do not understand clearly enough to reason further about, my life is effectively no different from never having thought about 'free will' at all.
So that's how I deal with it. In a way that is unsatisfactory to many people, because it seems to allow for a bit of 'insert magic here' just to satisfy my emotional need for the existence of some intuitive notion of free will. To which all I can say is: yes, I believe that believing "I don't understand" and being happy is better than believing "the best answer we can come up with is depressing" and not being happy.