> They are possibly vulnerable to being discovered when inserting data if the attacker knows what they are inserting.
If we go by the theory that compromising a single Tor user is not feasible, then connecting to the Freenet network through a fresh Tor connection every time you want to insert new data should make it a lot more difficult to find the identity of the person who is inserting this data.
I'm thinking here in the context of operating a black market, where new items are signed with the operator's key, and uploaded to Freenet, along with a list of all items on the market in question, also signed by the operator (with an increasing nonce).
new items are signed with the operator's key, and uploaded to Freenet, along with a list of all items on the market in question, also signed by the operator (with an increasing nonce).
It really confuses me why people insist on thinking about electronic systems of exchange in broken physical world terms: market/store, buyer, seller. See https://github.com/OpenBazaar/OpenBazaar/issues/961
I don't see what's "broken" about these terms. People understand them, and they serve their purpose: explaining the roles of various nodes in the network.
However, I understand your argument that there's really no need to differentiate between "buyers" and "sellers": every node on the network could be either, both or neither at any point in time.
I don't think changing the language used in OpenBazaar really makes much of a difference though. I doubt people are that interested in doing barter trading via an online market. That seems very inefficient (ie. sending a pound of beef jerky in in the mail in exchange for receiving five LED bulbs). The only reason for doing this would be if the two parties don't have proper money available.
It'd be a lot more efficient for either party to sell their good (beef jerky or light bulbs) for money locally (for example bitcoins), and pay for the other item in bitcoins, so only a single good needs to be sent via mail. The party receiving money can then just buy the goods he wants locally.
If we go by the theory that compromising a single Tor user is not feasible, then connecting to the Freenet network through a fresh Tor connection every time you want to insert new data should make it a lot more difficult to find the identity of the person who is inserting this data.
I'm thinking here in the context of operating a black market, where new items are signed with the operator's key, and uploaded to Freenet, along with a list of all items on the market in question, also signed by the operator (with an increasing nonce).