What would be an example of "cold storage" that allows moving all BTC in a single transaction?
Have all the private keys stored on a machine which is airgapped. Sign a transaction on that machine; copy the transaction to a networked machine (could be done via e.g. copying a QR code from the monitor with a smartphone or, in extremis, just typing very carefully); release onto the Bitcoin network.
And how does the fact that it is accessible via VNC change anything?
Management has previously said that Gox's cold storage was based on offline copies of the keys being fixed onto paper and held in 3+ locations, sprinkled with some RAID-esque pixie dust. (I promise -- this is the maximally charitable summary.) If they're all available for management via VNC at any given time, that casts some doubt about whether they are actually striped over a bunch of paper wallets. Although the Bitcoin community is primarily worried about a server compromise followed instantly by a wallet draining, putting them on a machine accessible from the internal network is approximately just as dangerous, since one assumes that an attacker who gets the web server owns the entire internal network with probability approaching 1.
Have all the private keys stored on a machine which is airgapped. Sign a transaction on that machine; copy the transaction to a networked machine (could be done via e.g. copying a QR code from the monitor with a smartphone or, in extremis, just typing very carefully); release onto the Bitcoin network.
And how does the fact that it is accessible via VNC change anything?
Management has previously said that Gox's cold storage was based on offline copies of the keys being fixed onto paper and held in 3+ locations, sprinkled with some RAID-esque pixie dust. (I promise -- this is the maximally charitable summary.) If they're all available for management via VNC at any given time, that casts some doubt about whether they are actually striped over a bunch of paper wallets. Although the Bitcoin community is primarily worried about a server compromise followed instantly by a wallet draining, putting them on a machine accessible from the internal network is approximately just as dangerous, since one assumes that an attacker who gets the web server owns the entire internal network with probability approaching 1.